Loops HouseSealedChoice

NEAR HACKATHON
Links
Team
1 member- FAOwner
Farouk Allani
Overview
Problem: when a DAO, grant program or company hires a supplier through a tender, whoever holds the bids can leak them to a favoured bidder, change the scoring rules after seeing who bid, and score in private. Losing bidders cannot check anything.
What we built: SealedChoice, sealed tenders on NEAR. The buyer publishes the rubric, committee, deadline and bond and escrows the budget; all are fixed at creation. Suppliers encrypt bids in the browser to a tender key derived inside an OutLayer TEE, so the chain stores only ciphertext. After the deadline the contract freezes the bid set under a Merkle root and has the pinned evaluator score the bids once: code checks eligibility, scores price and ranks; two NEAR AI Cloud models score the proposal text with quotes that code checks, and never see prices. The contract accepts one result. A human committee awards on-chain, and choosing a lower-ranked bid requires a written rationale stored on-chain. Escrow pays the winner. A public verifier rechecks ten properties without a wallet.
How NEAR fits: OutLayer holds the tender keys and runs the pinned evaluator in a TEE, called from the contract through yield/resume. NEAR AI Cloud provides private inference with signed request and response hashes. The Rust contract enforces deadlines, the one-result rule, awards, bonds and NEP-141 escrow. NEP-413 wallet messages derive private reader keys for debriefs.
Status: testnet prototype with test tokens. Three tenders completed, two awarded and paid through real wallet flows, and ten recorded attack attempts at sealedchoice.com/attacks. The contract account has no access keys. Still trusted: the OutLayer secret owner keeps its key. Cross-chain payout through NEAR Intents is deferred.