Loops HouseRajista Pay on NEAR

NEAR HACKATHON
Links
Team
1 member- OLOwner
Oluwasogo Ajala
Overview
Problem: a shop in Nigeria prices in naira, but more customers now hold their money as USDT or USDC, on whatever chain their employer or exchange uses. Taking that at a counter today means screenshots, wallet addresses typed by hand, and hoping the right amount arrived on the right chain.
Product: Rajista Pay. The cashier rings up items in naira at a rate the shop sets; the till creates an invoice on NEAR with a function-call till key (no wallet prompt per sale) and shows a QR code. The customer picks the coin and chain they already hold (USDC or USDT on Solana, Base, Arbitrum, Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Optimism, Avalanche, Tron or NEAR). NEAR Intents 1Click quotes the exact USDC the invoice needs and delivers it to the contract with the invoice id attached (customRecipientMsg). The till turns green, the shop withdraws USDC on NEAR and exports a CSV for its books.
How NEAR fits: the invoice contract rajistapay.near decides every payment, not a server: an invoice is paid once and only in full, and money that arrives through intents.near is never bounced back (a second or short payment is held and shown to the shop as a refund owed). The contract account has no keys, its build is reproducible from the repo, and the item list is bound to the invoice by a SHA-256 hash.
Proof on mainnet, 12 Nov 2026: a customer paid a N1,140 invoice with USDC on Base, NEAR Intents delivered 0.85 USDC to the contract, and the shop withdrew it. npm run verify re-checks every claim from a public RPC (10 checks). 36 contract tests; the whole flow also runs free on testnet.
Prior work, disclosed in the README: a Solana version of Rajista Pay; nothing from it is reused. My other entry is AfriRadar on NEAR (Agent Economy).