Loops HousePlinth

NEAR HACKATHON
Links
Team
1 member- UNOwner
Unaji Jacob
Overview
Plinth is a shared fund on NEAR that nobody can change, not even its creator.
The problem: in most pooled funds someone holds a key that can change the rules, pause the fund or stop withdrawals, and depositors have to trust them.
How Plinth works: each fund is a NEAR account with zero access keys, running one published, reproducibly built copy of the code (a NEP-591 global contract by hash, created through a keyless factory). Its rules (tokens, trade size, cost cap, trades per day) are fixed at launch. A manager (a person, an AI agent, or nobody) can only propose a swap with a signed NEAR Intents 1Click quote; the contract checks the signature and every rule and refuses anything else. Depositors join with the base token (later, in kind) and can always exit with their share of every token, with no oracle and no permission.
What we showed on NEAR testnet (all transactions linked in the repo):
- a hijacked manager sending the fund to an attacker was refused on chain;
- two AI models on NEAR AI Cloud must agree: given a hidden prompt injection, one tried to send the whole fund to an attacker, the other refused, and nothing was sent; signed AI receipts are verified in the browser;
- a manager-less fund where anyone triggers a strategy run in an OutLayer TEE, still bounded by the same on-chain checks;
- idle wNEAR staked into stNEAR, a management fee paid in shares, in-kind joins and exits.
Security, told honestly: a review found a critical accounting bug in our own first two releases (bounced transfers counted as holdings). We proved it, fixed it in release 0.3 so the fund reads no balance at all (refunds arrive through a per-fund relay), labelled the old funds, and recorded three further review rounds in docs/SECURITY.md. 158 unit tests, sandbox regression and invariant tests, and CI that rebuilds the released code byte for byte.
Everything runs on NEAR testnet with test tokens. Live site: https://unajijacob6-create.github.io/plinth/