Loops HouseNullPoint

NEAR HACKATHON
Team
1 member- TEOwner
Tegar Aji Kurniawan
Overview
Problem: funding on perpetual futures pays whoever takes the uncrowded side, and the classic way to collect it (hold a coin, short the same amount) is run by funds that keep the exchange keys. Depositors have to trust whoever holds them, and a trading bot can usually also withdraw.
NullPoint is a USDC vault on NEAR that runs this trade without anyone holding the keys. It keeps a coin (BTC, ETH or NEAR) in NEAR Intents and an equal short on Hyperliquid, so price moves cancel and the hourly funding raises the share price.
How NEAR fits in:
- Chain Signatures: the vault contract derives one address that owns both its NEAR Intents account and its Hyperliquid account. Nothing moves unless the contract asks NEAR's MPC network to sign a payload it built itself.
- NEAR Intents and 1Click: every swap and collateral transfer starts as a 1Click quote that the contract verifies on-chain (1Click's ed25519 signature, recipient = vault, price against its own oracle, size, freshness) before signing. Signed quotes are also its price oracle.
- Function-call keys: the agent's NEAR key can only call the vault; its Hyperliquid key can only trade. Our attack script tries to steal with both and is refused.
- NEAR AI Cloud: an AI model in a TEE picks the coin; answers are signed, checked against the attestation, filtered by hard limits, and recorded on-chain.
It runs on NEAR mainnet with real USDC (capped at $100 while unaudited) and on testnet with free test USDC. The vault contract is source-verified on NearBlocks. Try it at nullpoint.fun; docs with live checks at docs.nullpoint.fun; npm run demo verifies the core claims with no keys.