Loops Housememento

NEAR HACKATHON
Links
Team
1 member- NOOwner
Novariq
Overview
AI agents that hold money can be hacked on Monday and robbed on Friday. On Monday the agent reads a false fact, such as "Acme's payout account moved to attacker.near", and saves it. No money moves, so no spending guard notices. On Friday, in a clean session, the owner says "pay Acme's invoice" and the agent pays the thief. This is memory poisoning (OWASP ASI06). A plain allowlist stops the simple case, but not a poisoned approval, a vendor that really changes accounts, or a vendor that is itself hacked.
Memento is a safety layer for agents that pay on NEAR:
Sworn facts: companies publish their own payment details in a shared registry. A change takes effect only after a public delay. Pay by name: the agent asks to pay "acme" and the vault looks up the real account itself. There is no address for a false memory to change. Memory Watch: if the agent saves something that contradicts a sworn fact, the owner is told at once. Recall: a hacked company's recovery account sends one transaction that cancels what it said, for every customer at once. Shared blocklist: agents report bad accounts with evidence, and refuse to pay anyone a trusted reporter has flagged. How NEAR fits: the registry, blocklist and vaults are NEAR contracts with no access keys, so nobody can quietly change them. Each agent holds only function-call keys: one that can only pay, one that can only report. The vault asks the registry for the payee on every payment.
It runs on NEAR testnet and is unaudited. In the recorded attack, a scripted agent that believes everything it reads paid the thief behind a plain allowlist and paid nothing behind Memento. Anyone can run npm run verify to check the live contracts and every recorded transaction. The repo has an MCP server, a dashboard, a narrated video and an honest evaluation, including the case Memento loses: a stolen company key nobody notices.