Loops HouseLevee

NEAR HACKATHON
Links
Team
1 member- QVOwner
Qvkare
Overview
Aave borrowers get liquidated in fast moves and pay the liquidator a bonus. Levee repays first: when a health factor falls below the trigger the borrower set, it sells just enough of the borrower's own collateral on Uniswap v3 to repay USDC debt back to their target. The position stays in the borrower's wallet.
The borrower authorizes LeveeUnwind, an EVM helper with no owner and no upgrade path, and approves a capped amount of their aToken. The helper checks on chain that the health factor is below the trigger, that the collateral and pool are the ones authorized, and that the sale is within the borrower's price bound against Aave's oracle. There is no Safe, module or credit delegation, and revoke() stops it at once.
NEAR is the policy layer. The keeper's function-call key can only ask the Levee contract for a repay. The contract checks caps, budget, cooldown and fee ceilings, builds the EVM transaction itself, and has it signed through Chain Signatures for a rescuer address it controls on each chain. Both testnet contract accounts have no keys, so nobody can change the code.
Live on Base Sepolia and NEAR testnet: seven rescues from collateral, each from health factor 1.48 to 1.80 with a median of 7.9 s from detection to Base inclusion, the last two after the contract lost its keys. Thirteen earlier rescues repay from a USDC reserve. make verify reads every run back from public chains.
A backtest replays every native USDC borrower on Aave v3 Base and Arbitrum through two crashes and a calm month, pricing each sale from a real Uniswap quote at its landing block. In the crashes, repaying from collateral avoided $781k and $1.07M of liquidation bonus, a net of +$175k and +$774k after swap costs and gas. In the calm month it cost $122k net. The README lists what these figures leave out.
Site and public risk reader: https://leveefi.xyz