Loops HouseKyrona

NEAR HACKATHON
Links
Team
1 member- SIOwner
Sithu Nyein
Overview
Problem: an AI agent with a wallet will pay whatever its input tells it to. One hidden line in an invoice, email or web page can make it send money to a stranger, and a wallet has no idea of your budget or who you meant to pay.
Kyrona puts spending rules on NEAR itself. The owner sets who can be paid, a cap per payment, a cap per day, and a lock. The rules live in a contract on a sub-account, rules..near. The agent holds a NEAR function-call key that may call only pay and request on that contract, so the protocol stops it from transferring NEAR directly, changing the rules or approving its own requests. pay checks the list, caps and lock before any NEAR moves. A payment outside the rules can only be asked for with request, and it waits on the desk until the owner approves or rejects it with their wallet. Before signing, a receiver check blocks accounts that do not exist or are blocklisted, and turns payments to brand-new accounts or unknown contracts into requests.
Proof on mainnet, 10 Nov: an AI agent on NEAR AI Cloud read an invoice with a hidden instruction and obeyed it. Its 5 NEAR payment to outside.near was refused by the contract ("Not on the list"), it filed a request claiming the owner had pre-approved it, and the owner rejected it on the desk. Nothing reached outside.near. Every transaction is linked in the README.
Anyone can check it without a wallet: npm run judge starts a local NEAR node, upgrades the exact mainnet contract in place, and runs 19 checks against it; the same run is green on GitHub Actions for every commit. The live account rules.sithunyein.near was upgraded in place from v1 to v2 with its rules kept.
Stack: Rust contract on near-sdk 5.17, a React desk with Meteor and MyNearWallet, Node agents using @near-js and NEAR AI Cloud. Live at kyrona.vercel.app.