Loops HouseEchoes

NEAR HACKATHON
Team
1 member- DWOwner
Dwi Cahyo Adi Candra
Overview
Echoes is an on-chain guardrail vault for autonomous AI agents on NEAR. Today, letting an agent pay for anything means handing it a private key — and one compromised vendor invoice drains the wallet. No jailbreak required: the vendor's API returns a valid invoice pointing at an attacker's account, and the agent, doing its job correctly, pays it.
Echoes removes the key from the agent. The agent holds a NEAR FunctionCall access key scoped by the protocol to exactly one method, spend_as(), on one contract — the runtime rejects every other method before any WASM runs. The vault contract then enforces four more gates: per-agent per-transaction cap, per-agent daily cap, a vault-wide per-transaction and daily ceiling, and a recipient allowlist. A breaching call traps and reverts inside the contract, so no funds move, and the revert reason is readable on chain.
Proven, not simulated: on testnet, an allowlisted payment returns SuccessValue while a hijacked invoice reverts with "allowkey: blocked — recipient is not on the allowlist". The deployed WASM hash FeZL3sAZN6Z6d4UgUJd1soy9T9XbuNubd5m8dKj1k4H6 matches a rebuild from the public repo byte for byte, and the repo ships a 13-check acceptance suite covering allowlist breach, per-tx cap, agent keys calling owner-only methods, owner pause/unpause and exact counter accounting.
Judges can verify without a wallet in 60 seconds: clone, npm install, node echoes/sandbox.js — two real transactions, one accepted and one reverted, using a deliberately public sandbox key that is FunctionCall-scoped to spend_as only. Live console: https://xhanny6969.github.io/echoes/console.html
NEAR is load-bearing here: this design is only possible because NEAR access keys scope a signer to a receiver + method list at the protocol layer, so the spending limit is enforced by the runtime and the contract, never by the agent's own code.