Loops HouseDotx3

NEAR HACKATHON
Links
Team
1 member- JOOwner
Josh Jacobsen
Overview
X3 Force Field combines typed .x3 owner policy, deterministic checks and signed-quote enforcement for AI-agent payments.
Owners write reviewable mandates; agents propose payment programs. Compiler and mandate checks reject unsafe proposals outside the model. NEAR x3-guard verifies signed NEAR Intents / 1Click terms before authorizing a deposit address. The model cannot change the stored mandate.
Six differentiators: typed, hashable policy; checks outside the model; authenticated quote-term enforcement; source-to-payment traceability; restricted agent-key methods; reproducible evidence. JUDGES.md maps each claim to source, receipts, commands and limits. submission/judge-claims.json provides the same evidence paths and source hashes for automated review; invoice06_chain.py --json reproduces the archived five-link trail.
Mainnet invoice_06: following owner approval, a restricted key accepted a quote after 21 Guard checks. The mandate capped each payment and daily spend at 25 USDC, restricted the recipient and pinned refunds. The policy floor was 24.75 USDC. The owner manually sent 25 USDC on Solana; 24.9952 USDC reached x3lang.near about 84 seconds later. The agent recorded Settled and floor_met. Both original .x3 hashes match Guard state; compiled output matches 10 policy fields and 13 mandate terms. Eight unsafe edits of that payment are refused locally.
Other local evidence: 8/8 scripted red-team attacks and 3/3 replayed wallet-drain attacks refused, authorized control allowed; 9 unsafe edits fail compilation. Historical testnet Guard evidence includes attacker.near refusal.
Limits: one owner-assisted ~$25 run. Guard is noncustodial and does not authenticate outcome hashes. The agent account retains an owner FullAccess recovery key. Provider association is not cryptographic cross-chain atomicity; no native X3VM runs on-chain. Compiler/VM predate the hackathon; NEAR integration is new work.