Loops HouseBursar

NEAR HACKATHON
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Team
1 member- STOwner
Stefano Molari
Overview
Companies pay fake invoices because whoever pays can be fooled: the "please note our new bank details" fraud, duplicates, invoices nobody ordered. Handing payments to an AI agent that holds the keys makes it worse.
Bursar is an AI treasurer that cannot move money on its own. The AI reads the invoice PDF inside a trusted execution environment (NEAR AI Cloud): the enclave attests itself first and signs what it read, and anyone can verify that receipt later. The agent's key is a NEAR function-call key that can call one method, request_payment. The company's own policy contract on NEAR decides: vendor allowlist, the payout the owner registered, per-payment and daily caps, vendor budgets, purchase orders, duplicates, tax ids. Within the limits it pays USDC in the same transaction; at or above a threshold it holds the invoice for a person (the owner, an approver or a Sputnik DAO council); a changed payout or a duplicate is refused with the reason on chain. Vendors on Base, Arbitrum, Ethereum, Solana or Sui are paid through NEAR Intents: a plain executor, no AI, settles only on a quote 1Click signed for the vendor's recorded payout, and the contract verifies that signature.
How NEAR fits: private inference with attestation (NEAR AI Cloud TEE), agent spending bounded by function-call access keys and a policy contract, meta transactions (NEP-366) so the CLI agent pays no gas, cross-chain settlement (NEAR Intents), governance (Sputnik DAO).
What exists: the policy contract (Rust, 67 unit tests, three internal review rounds), a web console, a Telegram inbox with approvals, a CLI agent and relayer, an MCP server with ten tools, a public registry and explorer. Live on testnet at bursar.network; done on mainnet with real USDC on 2 and 3 November 2026, every step linked in the README. Software, not a payment service: funds stay in the company's own contract, under the company's keys.