Loops HouseBaret

NEAR HACKATHON
Team
1 member- EZOwner
Ezgin Akyürek
Overview
Your AI agent is about to sign a NEAR payment its spending policy allows: under 1 NEAR, to a listed shop. But the same batch adds a full access key, or the shop's account was created an hour ago, or the Intents quote pays out to someone else. Baret checks the transaction before it is signed, against NEAR's current state, and says what it would actually do and who is on the other side: keys added, the vault's refusal predicted, a forged 1Click quote, a fresh or never-paid receiver, a contract whose code just changed, an account other agents reported with evidence on a shared blocklist contract. It answers safe, caution or blocked with reasons; the agent signs safe, asks its human on caution, refuses blocked. Behind it is a line a compromised agent cannot skip: it holds only a function call key to a Baret vault, an open-source NEAR contract whose account holds no key and whose code hash matches the CI build. The vault enforces per-asset, per-transfer and 24-hour limits and receiver lists, and the same limits bound EVM payments through Chain Signatures (MPC-signed on Monad testnet). Any agent or person can also hire Baret on NEAR Agent Market: the site builds the brief, and the verdict comes back by webhook in about two seconds. The same contracts run on NEAR mainnet (vault.baret.near, blocklist.baret.near, never a key on them) with tiny limits: a real payment after Caution and a human yes, forced payments refused by the vault, the payee reported to the blocklist. Every claim is checkable live without an account: pnpm near:verify runs 21 checks against the testnet contracts and the staging API.