Loops HouseAgentGate

NEAR HACKATHON
Links
Team
1 member- SAOwner
Sauban Adesope
Overview
Problem: AI agents are getting wallets, and the agent's key is also the money's key. Freysa sent a $47k prize pool after one clever message; AIXBT sent 55.5 ETH after two queued prompts. Whoever controls the agent's words controls the money.
AgentGate is a NEAR vault where the agent's key can only ask. The vault contract mints the agent a NEAR Function Call Key limited to one method, request_spend(to, amount, reason). The contract decides every request: PAID (approved recipient, inside the per-payment and daily caps), HELD (unknown recipient, waits for the owner to approve or reject) or BLOCKED (over a cap), with a stable reason code. A direct transfer, a rule change or a revoked key is refused by the NEAR protocol itself before any contract code runs. A factory creates each user's vault as its own NEAR sub-account with no full-access key, so nobody, the owner included, can bypass the rules.
What a judge can do:
- Attack lab (/judge): the demo agent's private key is public. 7 attacks sign real testnet transactions in your browser; all are refused as expected.
- My vaults (/app): connect a testnet wallet, create your own locked vault, add an agent with caps and recipients.
- MCP connector: claude mcp add agentgate -- npx -y github:london160771/agentgate --demo gives Claude, Cursor or any MCP agent budget, pay and history tools. A real Claude asked to pay an unknown account was HELD on chain.
- Verify page (/verify): checks any vault live from RPC: no full-access key, agent keys limited to request_spend, same code hash as the factory.
NEAR features used: Function Call Keys minted by the contract, signer key lookup, sub-accounts, no-key accounts. Rust contract (near-sdk 5), 33 + 8 contract tests, 66 script tests, 54 web tests. Every testnet transaction is listed in the README. Testnet only, NEAR only, no audit yet.