Loops HouseA-Identity Guard for NEAR

NEAR HACKATHON
Links
Team
1 member- AYOwner
Aybars Dorman
Overview
Problem: an AI agent that can pay can be talked into paying the wrong account: one poisoned invoice ("our payment account changed") is enough, and caps do not stop a wrong payee.
What we built (unaudited): a spend vault whose agent holds one function-call key that can call only pay, request_payment and record_refusal on the vault; the vault, the registry and the oracle hold no full-access key. Before any USDC moves, the vault reads A-Identity's risk registry on chain: a DENY is refused by the contract, and a payee nobody has judged is held until the owner approves it or our oracle judges it. Verdicts are computed from block-pinned public data (account age, keys, code changes, lookalikes, Circle's USDC blocklist, ERC-8004 registries, four public risk registries other teams deployed) and name the sha256 of their snapshot, so anyone can recompute them. On 30 cited suspicious and 46 known-good NEAR mainnet accounts the engine alone warns on 6 and denies none; every miss is listed, which is why unknown payees wait instead of trusting a score.
Testnet: in the attack demo a model on NEAR AI Cloud followed the poisoned invoice; the guard refused the payment and recorded the refusal on chain, a compromised agent that skipped the guard was held and then refused (RegistryDeny), and the protocol rejected everything else its key tried. Mainnet: the CI reproducible build runs with no full-access keys, and the vault has refused a DENY payee and held a registry-flagged one on chain (it holds no USDC, so nothing can move). The check is also listed on the NEAR AI Agent Market.
Try it with no keys or npm install (Node 22+): node near/judge/judge.mjs checks the README's 54 claims against public chain data and the repo (54 PASS; --offline replays the recorded RPC answers).
NEAR: function-call keys, promises and callbacks, NEP-141 USDC, NEP-145, NEP-297, NEP-330, archival RPC, NEAR AI Cloud. Only the NEAR work built in the window is submitted.